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ARGUMENT
I. IF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WIN THIS APPEALS CASE,
THEN FUTURE DEFENDANTS WILL NOT NEED TO RESPOND
TO PERSONALLY SERVED SUMMONSES OR NOTICES OF HEARING
ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND MAY WAIT UNTDL AFTER
JUDGMENT IS ISSUED AGAINST THEM, EVEN WHERE
THEY HAVE NO EXCUSABLE NEGLECT, AND THEN
SIMPLY MOVE TO SET ASIDE - A RULE OF LAW
WHICH WOULD CLEARLY CONTRADICT THE MEANING
AND INTENT OF THE CHANDLER WATVABBLITY STANDARD.
If the Defendants-Appellees are allowed to have this judgment set aside, then the rule of
law will become such that any defendant can simply ignore personally served summons, ignore
notices of hearing on default judgment, and ignore the entire judicial process, and then at some
point after default judgment is entered, i.e. when any collection effort is made, they will be able to
simply file a motion to set aside, not even based upon excusable neglect, and get the judgment set
aside. Clearly, this would be the end of the Chandler rule that arbitration clauses are waivable,
see Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), and indeed would incentivise
defendants to do nothing in response to summons - why do anything at all when a motion to set
aside is available in the end game? This is contrary to the established rule of law, namely the
Chandler rule, that defendants who do not assert the defense of arbitability waive that right. See
id.
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EL THE POINT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION RULE IS TO EXCUSE
DEFENDANTS WHO DO NOT IMMEDIATELY RAISE ARBITRATION, BUT WHO
DO SO BEFORE SUBSTANTIALLY PARTICIPATING IN THE LITIGATION.
THE SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION RULE SHOULD NOT BE MISUSED TO
JUSTIFY A DEFENDANT WHO NEVER APPEARS AND DEFENDS ITSELF AT ALL,
NEVER RAISES ARBITRATION, IGNORES A PERSONALLY SERVED SUMMONS
AND THE HEARING ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ALLOWS DEFAULT
JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED AGAINST IT WITHOUT EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
Chandler's substantial participation rule allows Courts to order arbitration even where a
defendant fails to raise arbitration right away, e.g. in its answer, but nonetheless does so during
the litigation, prior to substantially participating therein. Defendants-Appellees would have this
court misuse and misapply this rule to excuse a defendant who ignores personal service, fails to
respond, fails to attend the hearing on default judgment, and does nothing until after judgment has
been entered against him - a fact pattern wholly foreign to the facts in Chandler, and categorically
different; defendants should be required to raise arbitration or else be found to have waived it this is the fundamental holding of Chandler; to ignore legal proceedings and only raise the issue
after final judgment, and to nonetheless be allowed under a manipulation of the substantial
participation rule, to toss out everything that occurred until the motion to set aside was belatedly
made, would be to vitiate the fundamental waiver rule. Furthermore, it would elevate defaulters indeed defaulters with no excusable neglect basis for a set aside motion - above those who
respond to the suit and yet raise the arbitration defense late in that litigation, rewarding the
defendant that wholly ignored the litigation with a set aside and penalizing the defendant that
responded to the summons and appeared and defended themselves.
In other words, people that acted late in the game would be penalized while those that
acted only after the game was over would be rewarded. The wavier and substantial participation
2

rules would thus become irrational and internally inconsistent. Such a proposed legal scheme
should be rejected.
IIL IF DEFAULTERS ARE TO BE ALLOWED TO AVOID THE WAVIER RULE
AND THUS TO RAISE ARBITRATION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A SET ASIDE
MOTION, IT SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WHO ALSO BASE THEIR SET
ASIDE MOTION ON EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
Perhaps defaulters who defaulted because of excusable neglect should be able to have the
judgment set aside and thus to raise arbitration. But that is not this case. This case is one in
which the defendants moved to set aside solely on the basis of arbitration, and not on the basis of
excusable neglect. Such defendants fairly and justly come within the Chandler waiver rule - they
failed to raise arbitration in the litigation, and the litigation was concluded while they chose to sit
in default. There is no unfairness in enforcing the waiver rule in this case, and indeed, as argued
above, failing to enforce the waiver rule in this case would leave a waiver rule which would be
either wholly vitiated or else rendered completely irrational as it applied defaulting defendants
versus defendants who appear and defend and belatedly assert arbitration.
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS RATHER THAN FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE IN
QUESTION, THUS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DENOVO.
Appellant is not asking this court to review determinations of facts. Indeed there are no
facts in dispute. Rather, appellant is asking this Court only to review the appropriate application
of the legal standard for determining waiver of contractual arbitration rights where a party,
personally served, has defaulted and failed to appear and defend itself at a hearing or in response
to plaintiffs affidavits submitted thereafter, and allows default judgment to be entered, and only
then moves to set aside - not based upon excusable neglect, but merely upon the basis of a
belated, post-judgment invocation of a contractual arbitration clause. Again, the facts are not in
3

dispute; the question is legal in nature: whether a party under these undisputed facts has waived
its contractual arbitration right under Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah
1992). Thus the operative standard in this matter is de novo. See Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d
356, 360 (Utah 1992).
Even if the standard is abuse of discretion, the arguments set forth above clearly establish
that the only logical and consistent application and rule of law for the waiver standard to govern
arbitration motions is one under which defaulters, who were personally served and who failed to
raise excusable neglect, are to be held to have waived arbitration.
V. VAGUE ACCUSATIONS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ARE NOT WELL
TAKEN IN THIS CASE AND DO NOT PERTAIN TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
REGARDLESS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS CONDUCTED ITSELF IN
ACCORDANCE WITH EQUITABLE STANDARDS.
Defendants-Appellees argue that Plaintiff-Appellant's arguments should not prevail
because of equity. Such a "clean hands" argument is inapposite in this case; this case presents
questions as to the proper standard for detennining whethet a defei idant should be allowed to
raise an arbitration clause for thefirsttime in a set aside motion based not upon excusable neglect
but rather only on the existence of a contractual arbitration clause. Furthermore, and regardless
of Defendants-Appellees' invoking of equitable issues, Plaintiff-Appellant has acted equitably and
ethically in this matter; it personally served Defendants, held a hearing on the propriety of default
judgment, submitted affidavits regarding that propriety, and secured a judgment from the coi irt.
These actions comport wholly with equitable conduct and provide no basis for any kind of "clean
hands" argument, even if such argument were relevant.
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VI

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL.

The district court's order which is appealed herein was not afinalorder. This Court
already considered Defendants-Appellee's arguments to the contrary as they were asserted in
opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Leave tofilean Interlocutory Appeal, prior to this
Court's granting of leave tofilethis interlocutory appeal. The simple but fatalflawin
Defendants-Appellees' repeat argument on this point is the truth that the district court's order
merely sets aside the judgment and "orders the parties to arbitrate; it did not dismiss the case. The
order, which is set forth in the Addendum to Plaintiff-Appellant's opening brief, speaks for itself
in this regard, and plainly does not do what Defendants-Appellees' jurisdictional argument claims
it does (i.e. enter afinalorder dismissing the case).
"I II

PREJUDICE IN SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IS ('LEA R.

The setting aside of the default judgment clearly prejudices Plaintiff-Appellant. As it
stood prior to the granting of the set aside motion, Plaintiff-Appellant possessed a sizable
judgment against Defendants-Appellees, awarding it damages for Defendants-Appellees' breaches
of contract. Upon the granting of the set aside motion, Plaintiff-Appellant is set back to square
one, has no judgment, and must start over in the pursuit of this matter. This constitutes prejudice.
Furthermore, this was not a simple default process. Plaintiffs first went to the effort and expense
of having Defendants personally served in California. They then submitted default pleadings, and
the Court asked for a hearing, which Plaintiff attended and participated in, while Defendants did
not. The Court then had Plaintiffs submit affidavits to further support its petition for default
judgment. Only after having effectuated personal service, submitting default pleadings,
participating in the hearing, and preparing and filing the additional affidavits, did the Court grant
5

default judgment. All the effort and expense of these actions would be rendei eel meaningless and
wasted if the granting of the motion to set aside stands - this is additional prejudice to PlaintiffAppellant.
Indeed, if Defendants-Appellees were able to secure affirmation of the set aside order
below in this case, based upon the prejudice issue, then indeed no plaintiff in the same setting
would likely be able to establish prejudice. In a default setting such as this - where the defendant
has been personally served, ignored the summons, ignored the hearing, ignored the process, and
moved only after judgment for set aside based only upon a never-before raised arbitration clause there is little if anything else that a plaintiff could have invested into the pi oeess so as to constiti ite
additional lost and wasted efforts constituting prejudice. Such a plaintiff has put forth everything
he could be required to put forth in a default setting: fulfillment of personal service requirements,
the holding of the hearing, the submission of additional affidavits, and the submission and securing
of the default judgment. No additional efforts could be expended and thus wasted, and nothing
more could, be done and thus lost, so as to have a case with an increased level of prejudice If
Defendants-Appellee's argument that there is no prejudice here is to be adopted and the order
below affirmed based thereon, then the issue of waiver of arbitration in settings such as this
becomes moot, since the such a prejudice standard would be essentially unattainable. The more
rational and logical ruling is tofindprejudice in the loss of the judgment and in the wasted time
effort and expense of the process required to secure such judgment and thereby to followthrough with the waiver rule as should be substantively applied in this case. When a defendant
has chosen to ignore personal service, chosen to ignore the hearing set to consider default
judgment, allowed the process as it continue forward thereafter, and allowed default judgment to
be entered against it, and only thereafter appeared and moved to set aside not based on excusable
6

neglect but only based upon a never-before raised nor asserted contractual arbitration
clause, such a defendant should be held to have waived its arbitration right.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore Plaintiff-Appellant asks the Court to reverse the district court's order setting
aside the judgment and ordering arbitration, thereby upholding a consistent and internally logical
waiver standard under Chandler and requiring defendants (who lack excusable neglect) to appear
and raise arbitration during the pendency of the litigation, and thereby rejecting the belated (and
unexcused by neglect) raising of arbitration rights by defendants who ignore personal summonses,
ignore default hearings, and ignore the process leading to the court's entry of default judgment
against them.
Dated this 7th day of July, 2003,
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 7* day of July, 2003,1 did cause two copies of the
foregoing to be mailed by US mail,firstclass postage prepaid, to the following:
Michael D. Hughes
HUGHES & BURSELL, PC.
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770
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